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ON PLURAL AND MASS NOMINALS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD 
Gennaro Chierchia 
O. INTRODUCTION 
Bare plural nominals in English (e.g • .!l.2&L ~ chairs. students with good 
~ have always represented a hard problem for any attempt of theoretical 
'explanation. In recent years, however, G. Carlson 1 has developed a framework 
which goes some way towards explaining this intricate phenomenon. Carlson's 
theory depends upon extensions of model-theoretic semantics of natural 
languages developed within what is often called Montague Grammar (MG). 
Carlson makes use of assumptions about the way that speakers of natural 
language conceptualize the structure of the world in order to analyze a body 
of linguistic facts. Thus, he is taking up the traditional claim that human 
languages have an underlying metaphysics, and expressing it within a precise 
,-~,< mode'l:theoreti:c" framework; His'me thod,' asapplie<d't'o" toe litud'y'ofElfg Hah 
bare plurals, can be thought of as an exercise in what E. Bach terms English 
metaphysics 2• What strikes me as appealing in Carlson's work is that by 
resorting to an extremely simple hypothesis on the semantic structure of bare 
plurals, he can make sense of otherwise very puzzling distributional patterns 
of certain English Noun Phrases (NPs). 
In the present paper, I will propose several modifications and extensions of 
Carlson's approach in terms of the framework of Chierchia 1981, which 
constitutes an application to natural language semantics of work by N. B. 
Cocchiarella. Such an analysis, I will try to argue, allows us also to gain 
insight in the behavior of mass nouns. 
Section 1 of this paper will briefly review Carlson's analysis of bare 
plurals. Section 2 will discuss some of the difficulties inherent in 
Carlson's analysis. Section 3 will briefly present the semantic framework of 
Chierchia 1982a. Section 4 will develop a detailed semantics for bare 
plurals, as well as an outline for a semantics of mass nouns. Both will be 
argued to be cases of nominalization, i.e. of transformation of an expression 
denoting a property into something like a proper name. 
1. CARLSON ON BARE PLURALS 
One common feature of theories of the bare plural developed within the 
generative tradition is to resort to a phonologically null determiner-like 
element. These kinds of proposals, however, face the heroic task of 
explaining how constructions involving bare plurals can display heterogeneous 
sets of readings like the following: 
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" I' 
(I) dogs are mammals 
(1 ,) every dog is s mammal 
(2) dogs give live birth 
(2') most female dogs give live birth 
(3) dogs sre intelligent 
(3') most dogs are intelligent 
(4) dogs are barking in the ysrd 
(4') some dogs sre barking in the yard 
(5) dogs are numerous 
(5') ? 
The primed version of (1)-(5) should constitute the most plausible paraphrase 
with overt determiners of the bare plural NP ~ as used in the corresponding 
non-primed versions. 
One might be tempted to say that the hypothesized null determiner of bare 
plural NPs like those in (0 is simply ambiguous; it allows for a variety of 
readings: one universal, one existential, etc. But clearly no simple-minded 
appeal to ambiguity like this will do; each of (0-(5) has, in fact, a unique 
reading. For instance, (1) doesn't have any reading where the "null 
determiner" has, say, an existential import (under no circumstances could it 
mean "some dogs are mammals"). 
In addition to the above mentioned problem posed for the hypothesis of a 'uull 
determiner", there are a host of other elements which militate against it. 
They have to do with the fact that a quantified NP (also if its sole determiner 
is phonologically unrealized) should bear scope; therefore it should interact 
with other scope bearing items (like negation, adverbs, other quantifiers). 
However, Carlson shows that in presence of the latter items, bare plurals fail 
to display the expected scopal ambiguities. So, for instance, consider the 
following sentence (from Carlson 1977). 
(6) Mary wants to meet some football players. 
(6) has two readings. On one reading there are some specific football players 
that Mary wants to meet. On the second reading, Mary does not have in mind, 
so to speak, any particular athlete. Consider now the following: 
(7) Mary wants to meet football players. 
(7) shares with (6) the opaque or narrow scope reading, but lacks the 
transparent or wide scope one. If there is a phonological null determiner in 
(7) with an existential import, some explaining will be needed to account for 
18 
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the lack of wide scope reading. Carlson displays a large number of facts of 
this sort arguing quite convincingly that bare plurals behave more like proper 
names than like quantified NPs such as some!!!!m.. (For a rapid review of the 
relevant data. see Chierchia. 1982). He accordingly proposes to treat bare 
plurals as proper names. But names of what7 
'1.1 Referring ~ kinds. Carlson's idea is that corresponding to common 
n~uns. whose semantic type in Montague's Intensional Logic (IL) is <e.t>.3 
,there are particular individuals {i.e. objects of type ~ that he calls kinds. 
So. for instance. corresponding to the CN ~.4 there is in the domain of 
individuals the kind of dogs. or dog-kind; kinds will be related to the 
intension of the corresponding CN through devices that we will consider in a 
moment. Bare plural NPs simply name kinds: .!!!!Ja. in (1) just refers to the 
kind of dogs. like John refers to John. 
A consequence of this hypothesis is that it is to the predicate (rather than 
to the NP) that the different readings. and in particular the difference 
between the universal and the existential reading of the bare plural 
(exemplified by (1) and (4) respectively) should be somehow attributed. The 
k0?MyYidea."i.s •• that, .. c.ertain,.,Rr~~i,c~t~~Jt, •• Sl1C:ILa.~,,~.k . .!!. mammal. ,~ k human., to know 
. Latin. concern a "permanent" or "stable" property in individuals'; such' 
properties. so to speak. don't use up time. When we attribute the property of 
being a man to John. we are considering the individual in its entirety. and 
not a particular event in John's life. 
There are. however. other predicates. like ~k running ~.!:l.A!.L..~k on 
lli roof. l!l. ~ rum .!!. hamburger. which attribute a more temporary property 
to the SUbject. concerning an episode or event in his life. Clearly.,' with 
respect at least to verbal predicates. this distinction is somehow related to 
the stative vs. non stative oneS. Let's agree to call the properties denoted 
by the first kind of predicates characterizing properties. and the ones 
denoted by the second kind of predicates episodic properties. The distinction 
between characterizing and episodic properties is held responsible. by 
Carlson. for the universal and existential reading of bare plurals. 
respectively. The way he proposes to implement such a distinction in the 
grammar is quite suggestive. He assumes that the domain of individuals is 
further partitioned into objects and stages. Objects are ordinary things. 
like me. my pen. Luciano Pavarotti. etc. Stages are something like 
spatiotemporal slices of things; each object organizes a set of stages and 
makes them stages of one and the same individual. So. for instance. when we 
say that John ran to class yesterday. we are saying something about a certain 
spatiotemporal section of John's. Non-state-properties crucially involve 
stages and thus can be modeled as sets of stages. On the other hand. when we 
say that John knows Latin. we are considering the object John as a whole; 
characterizing properties speak of objects and not of local episodes in their 
histories; this suggests that we can model them as. say. sets of objects. 
19 
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Carlson offers a series of independent grammatical criteria upon which tl 
partitioning of English predicative expressions into object-level and stag, 
level predicates is based. This is not the place to go over them (c 
Carlson, 1977, pp. 66 ff.). The output of such partitioning can be rough: 
summarized as follows. Predicate nominals (like ~.It man) and stative verI 
(lQn, hate, know, etc.) apply to objects; adjectives seem to constitute 
mixed set: SOme appear to apply to objects (basically those that disli~ 
!.ll!.!:J.-insertion: intelligent, lUlt, l:rl, etc.) others to stages (tt 
complement set of the former: drunk, available, present, etp.). In genera: 
prepositional phrases (like (be).Q.!l~ roof) hold of stages, together wit 
non-stative verbs· (.!J!!t, kill, lli, etc.). 
So, according to Carlson's proposal we have at least three disjoint sets 0 
entities in our domain of individuals (usually denoted as De in the M 
literature): kinds, objects and stages. C~rlson calls objects and kind 
together individuals. Let x~, x~, x~, and x~ (for each natural number n) b, 
variables of type ~ ranging over stages, objects, kinds, and individuals 
respectively. Carlson introduces also two "realization" or "instantiation 
relations Rand R'. Intuitively, R(x,y) holds just in case that x is aI 
individual <i.e. object or kind) and y is one of x's stages, while R'(x,y: 
holds just in case that x is a kind, and y is an object that belongs to it. ThE 
interpretation of Rand R' is constrained by the following set of meanin~ 
postulates (Carlson, 1977, pp.263-264): 
(8) OAxOAl[R(X,y) + AzO[R(z,y) ++ z - x]J 
(9) OAxOAyk AzS[[R(x,z)1I R'(y,x)] + R(y,z)J 
(10) 0 A xSV yi [R(y,x) J 
(11) oAxkAyS[R(X,y) + VzO[R'(x,z)II R(z,y)]J 
(12) oAxkAykAzO[[R'(x,z)1I R'(y,z)J ++ x - yJ 
(8) guarantees that objects do not share stages; (9) says that if z is a stage 
of an object that belongs to a kind, z is also a stage of the kind as well; 
(10) requires that each stage is a stage of some individual; (11) says that if 
y is a stage of a kind there is an object of that kind such that z is a stage 
of it; finally, (12) is a sort of extensionality principle for kinds: two 
kinds are identical iff they have the same instances in every world. 
Carlson introduces bare plural NPs in the grammar with the following pair of 
rules: 
S 100. If a € PCN and a is plural, then FlOO(a) € PT, 
where FIOO is the identity function. 
20 
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r 100. 
So, for instance, the NP ~ is going to denote the property-set of that 
unique kind whose instances are all and only dogs. In this way it is 
guaranteed that the kind associated with ~ will be an entity closely 
related to the intension of the corresponding CN, in the sense that the dog-
kind will contain all the information contained in the intension of the CN 
.iQg.. 
1.2 Bare plurals and aspectual distinctions. Consider the following 
sentence: 
(13) Students ran a lot (to get to the department party on time). 
According to our criteria, (13) should concern stages of students. Its 
reduced trans lation into IL, according to the grammar Carlson defines, is 
(ignoring the adverb): 
Where P is the past tense operator (to be read as "it was the case that") and 
J!. is lXkO A zO[R(x,z) ....... student'(z)J. So (14) says that it was the case 
that some instance of the student-kind was running. However, (13) can have 
also a generic or habitual reading like in: 
(15) Students ran a lot (before the new generals paper policy). 
In (15) we are not reporting Ii certain event like in (13), but describing a 
habit students used to have; thus the criteria used so far push us to take 
(15) as a statement concerning individuals. 
In order to handle generic forms of non stative verb phrases, Carlson 
introduces an operator Gn'; this should be considered part of the aspectual 
system of verbs. Semantically, it maps non-state-properties into state-
pr,?perties. In a multisorted version of IL, its type "ould be «s,<eS,t», 
<el., t », where e S is the subtype of s tsges and el. is the subtype of 
individuals. Carlson tries to give further hints about the semantics of Gn' 
in the following terms; consider: 
(16) John smokes 
Smoke is a non s ta tive verb, therefore it is to be viewed as a property of 
stages. However, (16) has usually a generic reading, and its reduced 
translation according to Carlson's proposal will be: 
21 
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Where~' is of type <eS,t> and Gn'(A~) of type <ei,t>. (I7) should 
mean that there are "enough" stages of John involved in the activity of 
smoking for us to say that the individual John has the property of being a 
smoker. In other words, the truth value of (17) should depend somehow on the 
truth value of the corresponding eventive sentence, whose logical form would 
be: 
Precisely how the. truth conditions of sentences like (I7) should depend on 
those of sentences like (18) is not specified. 
So, Gn' is a VP-operator responsible for genericity; in English it happens to 
be morphologically unrealized, but in other languages it shows up as a real 
morpheme.6 
On the basis of the apparatus just outlined, Carlson is able to offer a 
conceptually simple and promising account of the intriguing behavior of bare 
plurals. Within the limits of the present paper, there is no space to 
consider fully the body of data Carlson analyzes and the details of the 
arguments he offers in favor of his analysis. The reader interested in those 
is referred to Carlson 1977. There are two aspects of his approach that I 
regard as particularly appealing. The first concerns the argument given 
against the idea that in the syntax or in the semantics of the bare plurals 
there is a determiner with universal or existential import.7 Toe second 
aspect concerns the fact that a set of genuinely linguistic facts (the name-
like behavior of bare plurals) is explained in terms of an hypothesis about 
what entities there are. It is important to point out that all the notions 
Carlson introduces are in one way or another independently needed in a grammar 
of English. That we do refer to kinds simply follows from the existence of 
NPs like !.!!At kind of thing. Also the bipartition of English VPs exploits 
criteria which, problematic as they may be, have nevertheless been 
independently proposed to handle well established linguistic facts concerning 
aspectual distinctions between statives and non statives, the behavior of 
adjectival phrases in there-clauses, etc. Of course, a fuller account of the 
bare plural will crucially depend on the working out of a general analysis of 
tense and plural. I think, however, that Carlson's theory imposes Some c1ear-
cut adequateness criteria on such a general theory, and might be viewed as a 
fragment of it. In this perspective, let's try to analyze in more details 
Some problems into which Carlson's proposal seems to run. 
2. PROBLEMS IN CARLSON'S THEORY 
2.1 Kinds of primitives. The way bare plural NPS are introduced in Carlson's 
grammar (cf. above p20) ensures that an object instantiates a kind, say the 
kind of dogs iff it is a dog. The dog-kind encodes (via the realization 
relation R') all the information encoded in the intension of the CN l!2& about 
22 
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what a dog is. This makes one wonder how kinds are different from the 
;', . ',intension of CNs. It seems that the only difference between the two amounts 
~;:':''" ..... tQ" the fact that kinds have an "individual" nature (Le. they: are in the 
~. ",: d~main of individuall De) while intensions of Cne have a "predictable" nature 
~,:~ ,(i.~. they belong to the set of properties D<s <e t»)' Carbon 0977, p. 97) 
,:. ,"~onsiders the possibility of analyzing kinds a'; no'minalized intensions of CNs. 
':', ':What I call here the nominalization of CN-intensions amounts to the 
~. 'i~troduction of NPs denoting kinds as a new "level" of tiP (say R1) whose 
I:,;:::,,' iemantic type would be «.,«s,<e,t»,t»,t>. Such a move, however, as I>·,,:, 'C~r1son also notices, hss far-reaching and quite devastating consequences on 
r,.';;,.: i:hJ overall organization of the grammar. It will force us to duplicate all 
1.~::.;::'predicates, since the function associated with a VP in a sentence like!!2&l. 
~'.::.>::tlL!!. would be of type «s,<e,t»,t>, and so could not be the same one 
!(;~ 'associated with a VP in a sentence like J.Qlm. U!.!U., which would be of type L' ''';;,<~:;t>. It is to avoid this duplication of predicates, forced by an sdherence 
~;t:"r';:ro the PTQ type system, that Carlson resorts to "kinds" of type e, together 
t';, , ·.'~it:h a realization relation R'. 
,- '".'-",,,- . 
r:\,"" Unfortunately, though, the sort of type-based problem Carlson is seeking to 
~~~~'r' v;o1d-e1ii;irtg'ifi""·itf-niatfy~otner"·'p·ta·c;e'sT':tI'c;ludi:tlg'-th'e;~ana'lyst8~of-factive8~"'-' 
1976), the analysis of the group reading of plurals (Bennett 1976), 
analysis of infinitives (Partee 1977), which seem to require a 
switching rule mapping sentences, plural common nouns. and verb 
respectively, into noun phrases. Just as is the case when we analyze 
kinds as intensions of common nouns, this requires the introduction of NPs of 
a 1II0re complex semantic type (eee Parsons 1979). 
Let's agree to call all syntactic and semantic processes which transform such 
categories as CNs, VPs, and Ss into noun phrases nominalization proces.e.. It 
is natural to attempt to treat the formation of English bare plural noun 
phr~ses as a particular instance of a nominalization process. Given a uniform 
analysis of nominalization processes we could hope to do away with such 
machinery as instantiation relations in favor of regarding kinds as 
nominalized common nouns. tn Chierchia 1982a, I have tried to provide just 
such a uniform analyeis of nominalizations, making essential use of the work 
of Nino Cocchiarella, and this analysis will be summarized in Section 3 below. 
2.2 1ilJ!&ll.llli! ob jecte. According to what Carhon says, stages are to be 
thought of as temporally limited manifestations of things. Objects are what 
tie stages together. One way to model these intuition. would be to regard 
stages as sets of spatiotemporal points and objects ae functions from some 
relevant set of parameters (say, worlds, times, and places) to sets of 
spatiotemporal points. A metaphyaics of this sort has been proposed, within 
the framework of possihle world semantics, by Cresswell (1973). An object 
would be snalyzed as a sort of individual concept. There are various 
difficulties with this position, however. The development of tense and modal 
logic in the 60's has had as a common assumption that there are relevant sets 
of coordinates, including, for example, a set of durationless temporal points, 
23 
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with resEect to which sentences are evaluated. Consider the following 
examples: 
(19) Mark is running. 
(20) run'(m) 
Just for the sake of discussion, let's make the dubious assumption that (20) 
represents the meaning of (19); we can say that (20) is true at a time j iff 
Mark is among the things that run at j. This seems to be undistinguishable 
from saying that there is a running stage of Mark at j. In other words the 
use of time (among other coordinates) as a parameter for the evaluation of 
sentences seems to make superfluous the notion of stage (for a similar 
criticism, cf. de Mey 1980). 
We can make the same point from another perspective. Let's pursue for a 
moment the idea that stages are sets of spatiotemporal points and objects 
individual concepts that have stages as their extension. Let's moreover 
assume that the logical form of sentences like (19) is not (20) but the 
following: 
(21) VyS[R(m,y) A.nm.'(y)] where m is Mark 
On the hypothesis we are considering, the value of m has to be an individual 
concept (call it y), not an individual. (21) would then be true at Some time 
j iff there is a set of spatiotemporal points!!. such that!!. is the extension 
of ~ (at some point of reference), and!!. is in the set of running things at j. 
There seem to be two difficulties here. First, unless we further constrain 
the realization relation R, yS could be any old stage of Mark, including a 
past or a future one. This would obviously mess up completely the tense 
system as is usually analyzed. If, on the other hand, R is constrained in 
such a way that the value of y can only be Mark's manifestation at the time of 
evaluation, then R becomes indistinguishable from Montague's 'v' operator, as 
is also pointed out by de Mey. However, and this is the second difficulty, if 
the value of y (i.e. !!.) is a set of spatiotemporal points, then (by the 
preceding argument> it will include the time of evaluation jj so (21) will 
more or less say that Mark's manifestation at j is in the region of running 
things at j, i.e. we are repeating twice the information concerning time. In 
conclusion, if the notion of stage is related to that of time, and if we have 
time among the coordinates for evaluating sentences, then it is not clear how 
to avoid redundancies. Talk about stages seems just to introduce a 
complicated way of saying things we could have expressed more simply. 
Carlson, however, dismisses the idea of analyzing objects as individual 
concepts with the following argument. consider (from Carlson 1977, p. 191): 
(22) George and Henriette are sitting here. 
(23) George and Henriette are petting dogs. 
24 
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The context of use should specify the place and time with respect to which 
both (22) and (23) are evaluated. But (22) entails that George and Henriette 
are sitting at the same place, while (23) does not entail that they are 
petting the same dogs. According to Carlson's theory, though, the reduced 
translation of (23) would look like: 
'(24) VyS[R(d,y),NxS[R(g,x)"VzS[R(h,z) ".I!.!!..t.'(x,y)" .I!.!!..t.'(z,y)lJl 
where d is the kind of dogs, g is George and h is Henriette 
So (24) seems to say that there is one and the same stage of the dog-kind such 
that George and Henriette are petting it; and this seems to go against our 
intuitions. But if stages of, say, the kind of dogs are sets of 
spatiotemporal points constituting dog-manifestations at the time and place of 
utterance, they of course need not be spatiotemporally continuous. Stages of 
individuals, like kinds, might well be scattered entities. Thus, if George 
and Henriette are protagonists of a petting episode of a stage of dogs, it 
does not follow that they are petting the very same individual dogs. 
_ In Carlson's theory, however, if (24) is true, then George and Henriette must 
0
W
-'-Ybe'petting the very same dogs; as a matter of fact, they must be petting the 
very same dog. This follows from meaning postulates (8) and (11). We have 
here further evidence that the notion of stage as implicitly characterized by 
Carlson's meaning postulates is indeed inadequate. The plurality of bare 
plurals simply gets lost; (24) is true in any model where George and Henriette 
are petting one dog (cf. once more de Hey 1980). 
The claim has been made that stages are crucially involved in distinguishing 
between verbs and nouns and between statives and non statives in general. So, 
they aim at an essential role in a theory of aspect. But to see whether a 
notion like that of stage can really help in building a theory of aspect, we 
have to provide a tighter characterization of it. We will try to do so in 
section 4 after having provided some more apparatus for the purpose. 
2.3 Object- ~ stage-Ievel~. Being optimistic about the preceding 
difficulties, let's assume that Carlson is right in claiming that the analysis 
of certain linguistic facts requires us to assign a different semantic 
structure to different families of predicstes. This raises the general 
question about how to implement such distinctions in a grammar. 
Three ways of proceeding come to mind: one based on syntactic subcategories 
(or syntactic features), one based on semantic sorts, and the third based on 
meaning postulates. We cannot consider them here in any detail. 
In what follows, I will discuss in some depth how Carlson implements the 
distinction in question in his grammar. In particular, I will have in mind 
the second fragment presented in Carlson 1977; I will aim at an intuitive 
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Carlson's grammar is based on a multisorted version of IL. The type of 
individuals ~ is partitioned, as we have already seen, into four subtypes: 
eS, ek , eO, e i ; a recursive definition of the set ~ of the subtypes 
corresponding to each of the hasic sort is then given. For any subtype, say 
<es ,t>, D<es ,t> will be the set of corresponding denotations. In psrticular 
D<eS,t> will contain characteristic functions defined just for stages and 
undefined for other sorts of individuals. This introduces truth-value gaps in 
IL. 
As we have also seen, Carlson assumes that there are VPs of two basic sorts: 
<eS,t> and <eO,t>. All basic intransitive verbs are taken to be of type 
<eS,t>. In order to assign in general a subtype to each lexical item, a 
UBa 
function£.in~a€cat is employed; so, for instance c(run) = <eS,t>, 
c(!!!.§.!I.) = <eO,t>, etc. Carlson also follows the standard practice in MG of 
analyzing NPs as sets of properties of objects; so John will be translated as 
)'P"l'(j) , where the subtype of j is eO. It follows then that if John' is 
applied to ~ then resulting reduced formula (namely run'(j» will be truth-
valueless, and thus semantically deviant. ~ can be properly applied to j 
only if it is raised to an object-level predicate by the operator Gn' 
yielding Gn'(Arun')(j), which represents the generic reading of John runs.~ 
This approach, therefore, tends to multiply syntactic ambiguities and to use 
the semantics to filter out undesirable reading of sentences. In fact a 
simple sentence like l%hn runs is ambiguous in infinitely many ways in 
Carlson's grammar, and it can have formulas of the form 
Gn'(Gn' ••• AGn'(.!1U!') ••• )(j) as its trans lat ion.l1 All of these formulas, 
except the ones we want, will come out sortally deviant. I find this an odd 
use of semantic sorts. A theory of sortal correctness is usually invoked to 
handle violations of selectional restrictions and related phenomena. Here, 
however, it is being used to rule out a case of syntactic over-generation that 
doesn't yield any deviant sentence, but attributes wrong readings. In other 
words, the syntax assigns to each well-formed sentence a lot of misfit 
meanings, which then commit suicide because of lack of truth-values. The 
consequences that this technique has in general on linguistic meta theory are 
unknown to me. Below, I will sketch an alternative to this approach. 
Carlson distinguishes three classes of transitive verbs. Non stative verbs, 
like ill. and ll!., select the existential reading of bare plurals (i.e. John 
pets unicorns means roughly that John pets some unicorns). Carlson proposes 
to capture this by analyzing verbs like hit as involving stages of the 
grammatical object they take, i.e. as being ultimately relations between 
stages of things. However, given that NPs denote sets of properties of 
objects, this cannot be accomplished directly. The type of this kind of 
transitive verb has to be «s«s,<ei,t»,t», «es ,t» so that they can take 
things of NP-type as arguments. What Carlson does is to define each non-
stative verb (1' in terms of a constant of IL (1+ of type <es,<eS,t». So, for 
instance, hit' is defined as follows: 
26 
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In this wayan existential quantification over stages is packed in the meaning 
of each non-stative transitive verb. The reduced translation of, say, John ~ 
~ unicorns will be: 
(26) VyS[R(j,y)" VzS[R(u,z) "P.!1.+(y,z)]] 
Where j is John and u is the kind of unicorns 
This approach requires for each verb of the class we are considering an 
opposite translation rule involving a constant of IL of type <es,<eS,t». 
Stative verbs appear to select the universal reading of bare plurals in object 
position (i.e. John ~ unicorns means roughly that John fears all of them). 
A way of handling this, according to Carlson, would be to treat statives as 
involving ultimately relstions between objects. Statives are thus treated in 
much th~ same way as non-statives, except that the former involve relations of 
type <e1 ,<eO,t». Here is an example: 
*~:*;">T1fe"~' third class of~ VPsCarIson 'individuates 'areintensiond:'verbs"like'n!k. 
These are claimed to select the existential reading of bare plurals in object 
position. If we treated them as we treated other non statives, we would regard 
them as involving relations among stages. There is a problem here, however. 
The way the bipartition between stage- and object-level VPs is obtained in 
Carlson's theory automatically extensionalizes transitive verbs. What this 
means is that intensional verbs like llll would ha.ve to be lexically 
decomposed, and llontague's treatment has to be given up. Now, it is very 
likely that Montague's treatment is not the ultimate solution to the obstacles 
that intensionality posits on the way to Truth. Yet in Carlson's theory, the 
abandoning of it is not argued for in any principled way, i.e. it is a mere 
accident. Moreover, it seems simply wrong to me to analyze verbs like n!k or 
~ for as involving stages of the object. If I am seeking Mary, I am not 
seeking a temporally bound manifestation of Mary. There are no stages of Mary 
that are involved in my seeking activity. Mary in her entirety is the ~ 
(in our "technical" sense) I am seeking. On the other hand, it seems to me 
that llll does select the existential reading of bare plurals in object 
position (i.e. John is seeking unicorns means that John is seeking any old 
unicorn, which is the usual paraphrase for "John is seeking a unicorn)". How 
is this possible given the framework we are assuming? The point is that being 
a relation between stages is sure enough a sufficient condition for selecting 
the existential reading of bare plurals, but not a necessary condition. 
Consider the following example: 
(28) John is looking for dogs 
(29) VyS[R(j,y)" look-for'(y,d)] 
where j is John and d is the kind of dogs 
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Let's assume that (29) is the reduced translation of (28). What (29) says i 
that John is involved in a dog-seeking activity. The nature of this activit 
is such that John cannot be really looking for all dogs, but just for som, 
(unspecified) dog. This can be in fact guaranteed by meaning postulate, if w, 
want such a guarantee to be part of the grammar of English. Here is how sucl 
a meaning postulate would look in Carlson's own formalism. 
(30) says that x is seeking a certain kind of thing iff that x is seeking at 
object of that kind. Given the intensionslity of ll§.k, it does not fo11o\ 
from (30) that there are specific objects that x is seeking. This gives us 
back a Montaguish treatment of intensionality, and is the route we will follow 
below. 
What we have said so far should be sufficient to give an idea of the 
difficulties that Carlson's way of implementing a bipartition of predicates in 
the grammar of English meets. To sum them up, we have (a) an unjustified 
multiplication of syntactic ambiguities, (b) a severe complication of the 
translation mapping that involves the function £. (cf. earlier this section) 
plus an individual stipulation of the translation for each verb, and (c) the 
abandonment of Montague's treatment of intensional verbs. The alternative we 
will consider below is based on meaning postulates and avoids all such 
difficulties. 
I will not discuss the operators Gn' and Qp. which, I think, constitute the 
most problematic aspect of Carlson's theory. To show what sort of difficulties 
they run into would require a separate work tackling more directly problems of 
verbal aspect. Thus, I will provisionally adopt them as they are without any 
further discussion. 
This concludes our criticisms of Carlson's proposals about bare plurals. We 
can now proceed to develop an alternative to Carlson's theory that tries to 
maintain its good features while avoiding its problematic ones. In order to 
be able to do this, however,we have to introduce some novelties in our 
semantics. 
3. AN OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF NOMINALIZATIONS. 
Several categories of expressions in natural language (common nouns, verbs, 
adjectives, etc.) are usually analyzed as denoting properties. Thus, 
semantics of natural languages must be based on some theory that tells us what 
sorts of things properties are and how they are predicated or attributed to 
individuals. Such a theory, for example, should specify what properties there 
may be, whether there is a property that holds of everything, what properties 
are definable terms of properties pt"eviously available, etc. The theory of 
properties and replication that Montague built into his semantics is based on 
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r 1< tbe theory of simple types. Such a theory seems to work well enough for 
r". natural languages. except for phenomena involving nominalization. In other 
r~ar'f8'. if we use properties like those denoted by; say • .!2. ~ beautifUl or .!2. L ~ .. ~.QM to speak about things like me. you. or my dog'Fido. everything works 
t~"",,;'ou't: fine. If. however. we use them to speak about other properties 
~r'7' (i~c1uding. maybe. cases of self-applying propertiea as in .!2. ~ beautiful i1. 
1':, ':,'.\l.§'utifuP we confront an anomaly. Consider the following eXBDIple: 
f' •• 
i';- . " " ri:I:it~~ ::':.':~:~'" 8,00 • ••• i. odd 
r:;·<:'ijpe theory requires that U II odd is to be aS80ciated with property of a 
j~<':;dlfferent type in (31) and (32), since in (31) it is attributed to an F> {;:~:'~dividual, while in (32) to a property. To implement such a requirement it 
!" .. ,":\o'ulc:\ be necessary to complicate the grammar, given the functional dependency 
f:',:;!;~ii~tween syntactic category and semantic typea usually &8sumed in KG. So type 
f';,;:;t,theory reveals its unnaturalnesa as a theory of properties and predication for 
!:':1:'n~tura1 languages.12 
c .", .. ,'_.<~ ~\. 
~q-4G"~~F'~~"5'~""'8",'C"-~-",>~"n'C+/ii4v_-~,C ___ """""~-_"-""-~",,",,,,,,=~""--""-~"~~"" __ "-____ "-~_''''_~-''''_""".~Q __ +_.~ 
t, ,";::'Nino Cocchiarella haa developed a family of systems for the logical analysia 
~;,;,:~\;f, nominalizs,tio,n. Such systems can be considered (type-free) axiomatic 
I~i:,:"~"eharacterizations of the, notion of property. Informally, they can be 
~<,~{'described as non-standard second-order logics that alloy for predicate 
~J&;~xpre8sions to occur in argument position. So, to give an example. in 
~;.:~<: Cocchiarella's systems, formulas like R(Q,x) or pep) are well-formed. Usually. 
I·'in second-order logic, properties are specified through a comprehension l:r~0 principle, i.e. an axiom of the form: 
~:-~; (cp) 
i--
If we allow. however, for predicative expressions to occur in argument 
position. it is necessary to restrict (CP) in order to somehow avoid Russell's 
paradox. Different ways of' restricting (CP) yield different logics for 
nominalization. The one that will be of interest to us is based on the notion 
of etratum. We say that a wff is a homogeneously stratified (or h-
stratified) iff there is a function f that maps each symbol of $ into a 
positive integer in such a way that for each atomic subformulan(al' .... Clu) of 
$,f(ai ) .. f(aj (where 1 ~ i. j ~ n) and fen) .. f(ai>+L It is poasible then 
to sdopt a version of (CP) where we require it to be b-stratified. In this 
way. the open' wffs through which properties can be specified cannot have the 
same vsriables occurring in both predicative and argument position. So, for 
instance, a wff of the form -pep) that might be employed to reproduce 
Ruseell's paradox is not h-stratifiedi thus a formula like . 
Vtllc[P(X}+-+VQ[Q" x ..... Q(Q)] 1 is not an instance of an h-stratified version of 
(CP). In other words. we cannot introduce Russell's property using an h-
stratefied comprehension principle. This is of course very approximate. 
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Within the limits of the present paper it is impossible, however, to go into 
further details. A logic for nominalization based on an h-stratified version 
of (CP) is developed in Cocchiarella 1979, and is called HST*. 
Let's spend a few words to try to give a rough idea of the semantics of formal 
systems like HST* with nominalized predicates. There are, essentially, two 
ways to go. On the one hand, we can take the notion of proPerty as a 
primitive. Restricting our attention to one-place properties, we might model 
them in terms of a set Pj then if U is the set of individuals, predication can 
be represented as a relation H in PXUj intuitively H{p,u) holds just in case u 
is in the extension of p. We can moreover assume that P ~ U, so that 
properties can be values of the individual variahles of our language. This 
amounts to sorting out the domain of individuals into two disjoint sets: 
predicable and unpredicable individuals. What the predication relation does 
is to associate with each predicable individual an extension. Using U and H 
we can build models for theories of properties like HST*. Intuitively, a 
formula of the form p{x) will be true in a model II iff H{IIPIIll' IIxlfll) where H 
is the predication relation specified by II and /Iaft ll is the value of a in ll. 
Another possibility is the following. We can model properties as, say, sets 
of individualS, and represent predication as set-membership, which is the 
route most commonly followed in modeling first-order theories. We can 
introduce, then, a function f that maps properties into individuals. Such a 
function can be viewed as providing, in intuitive terms, a "individual 
correlate" for each property. Nominalized predicative expressions (i.e. 
predicative expressions occurring in argument position) will denote not 
properties but property-correlates. So properties ~ ~ (as values of 
predicative expressions in predicate position) are not represented as having 
an individual nature (i.e. cannot be referred to by, say, names). They are 
systematically related to individuals, though, and these property-correlates 
are what nominalized predicates refer to. This view of nominalization is 
related to Frege's distinction between "concepts" and "objects". So. 
Cocchiarella calls a semantics based on a correlation function f as just 
described ''Fregean semantics". 
On the first approach we were representing properties as unspecified entities 
and using a predication relation to associate them with sets of objects as 
their extensions. On the second approach we model properties directly as sets 
of objects and map these sets to unspecified property-correlates. These 
intuitions can be made fully explicit, in the sense that along the lines just 
sketched a model theoretical characterization of various logics for 
nominalized predicates is possible (for a survey of the main results cf. Simms 
1980). If we implement HST* with (a modalized version of) an axiom of 
extensionality for properties, then the two approaches outlined above 
out to be equivalent. However, HST* is intended to offer an intensional theory 
of properties (i.e. in pure HST*, necessarily equi-extensional properties need 
not be identical). For the present purposes, though, we will stick to the 
traditional view of identifying properties with functions from possible worlds 
30 
14
University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 9 [1983], Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol9/iss2/3
to extensions. It should be kept in mind that such a view is not forced upon 
US by HST* .Rllll· 
On the basis of Cocchiarella's work. I have tried to develop a version of IL. 
called IL*. which allows for a treatment of nominalization. I am going to 
present now a brief and approximate description of IL*; a fully explicit 
'description of it can be found in Chierchia 1982a. In intuitive terms. IL* 
differs from IL in two respects. First. it allows for expressions of any type 
"to occur as arguments of a function. Second. it has a very simplified. one 
'might actually say trivial. system of types. In IL*. there are three types of 
",;things: properties-in-extension. properties-in-'intension and individuals. 
'Propositions are regarded as o-place properties-in-intension. More 
,specifically. we assume that for each natural number n. we have denumerably 
lIIany variables Py ..... P~ ..... and constants cy ..... C~ .... of type n. These 
will take as values properties-in-extension of n places; 0 will be the type of 
'~ell-forllled forlllulas. which will have. as usual. truth-values as extensions. 
We will have then. for each natursl nUlllber n. denulllerably lIIany vsriables 
pfin; .... p~.n .... and constants Cf·n ..... C~.n .... of type <s.n>. These will 
~range over n-place properties-in-intension. Additionally. we wil~ have 
denumerably many individual variables xI ..... xn .... of type e. Properties-in-
ion will be modeled as in IL. i.e. if iJ is the domain of individuals. 
will, bea, mem ber, 0 f,',~."w here, ~""'!'; 
Properties-in-intension will also be modeled as in' IL. 
i.e. as functions from points of reference to properties-in-.. xtension; each 
property-in-intension of type <s.n> will be a member of E~. ;"her~ W is the set 
of points of reference. In Montague's IL' (and in Chierchia 1981) W is takeIl 
to be I X J. where I is the set of possible worlds and J is a set of times. 
For the purposes of the present paper we will assume that W is IXJXD. where I 
and J are as above, and D is a set of places. The logical symbols of IL are-. 
(negation). ~ (material implication). A (universal quan~ifier). B (past tense 
operator). W (future tense operator •• ' (Montague's "up" operator. taking from 
properties-in-extension to propert ies-in-intension). .... (Montague's, "down" 
operator. taking from properties-in-intension to properties-in-exte~sion). 
(taking a formula and n variables to' give a predicative expression of type n). 
Other logical operators (including 'a' and '0') can be defined as usual. The 
rule of functional application (through which pfedication is analyzed) has the 
following form in IL*: ' 
(33) If /3 is an expression of type Il and 0. is of ;my type. then 
/3(0.) is' an expression of type n-l. 
So we allow 'for eXfre.ssions of any type to occur in argumen't position. To 
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For IL*, a Fregean semantics is assumed, i.e. predicative expressions in 
argument position denote correlates provided by a function f that embeds 
properties into the domain of individuals. The model theoretic frames upon 
which the semantics of IL* is based will have the following form: <U,<En>n 
I, D, J, ~, f>, where {O I, J. D are disjoint non-empty sets (worlds, times, 
and place respectively) and ~ is a partial order on J; (ii) for each n ,En = 
fiu EeU Ei where Ene = {O OU' (n-times) and Ei = EeIXJXD . (iii) f is n n.' ~ n n ' 
function from UU~ En ini:-oU such that for each u € -iI, -feu) = u. Once the 
constants of IL* are given a value through an interpretation fu,nction F with 
respect to a Fregean frameJl, it is possible to define recursively a function 
Ext, such that for any value assignment to the variables g, any world i, time 
j, and place d, and any well formed expression of IL* a, 
ExtJt i . d g (a) is the extension of a with respect toJl. and g at world i, 
time j'a~a'pia~e d. We will not give the details of such a definition here. 
On the basia of Ext it is possible to define in the obvious way a notion of 
truth and validity of lL*. In the definition of validity for IL* we will 
restrict ourself to stratified Fregean frames. First we say that a Fregean 
frame is strstified iff every instance of (a modalized version of) a 
stratified comprehension principle is true in it. Then we can say that a wff 
Q of IL* is IL*-valid iff it is true in every stratified Fregean frame. In 
this way we incorporate Cocchiarella's version of the stratification technique 
into our system. In particular, it turns out that the theorems of HST* are 
all IL*-valid. 
All this is certainly too sketchy to be fully convincing. I hope it will be 
sufficient to show, however. that a system like IL* constitutes a conceptually 
simple and interesting framework for the analysis of nominalization in natural 
language. 
4. A MODIFIED THEORY OF ENGLISH BARE PLURALS. 
4.1 !!l ontology for English. The hypothesis I wish to consider here is based 
on the idea that stages have a mereological nature but, in a sense yet to be 
made precise, do not directly involve time. They should be pieces of stuff, 
things somehow less structured than the inhabitants of our common sense world. 
I think we could regard them simply as portions or quantities of matter. In 
this way, the notion of stage will not be introduced as a new primitive but 
will exploit a machinery tbat has been argued (e.g. ter Meulen 1981) to be 
independently needed for the analysis of mass nouns. By inhabitants of our 
common sense world, I mean chairs, bottles, people, etc., which I will call 
"things" in scare quotes. Carlson's theory claims essentially that stages 
playa crucial role in tbe individuation of events and processes while 
"things" (Le. Carlson's objects) are involved in states. If we assume that 
reference to stages is crucially involved in a particular class of VPs then 
certain properties of the English aspectusl system (including the conditions 
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different readings of bare plurals, the differentiated behavior 
forms, etc.) could follow in a limple matter. This is what I 
pursue a little further. 
between stages and "things" will also depend on the different 
criteria required to identify them. Identifying something that floats 
air in front of me requires operations that are very different from 
required by the identification of something that hae the property of 
a good armchair. It's tempting to aay that events do not require that 
individuals involved be identified through .. sortal concepts, while states 
The notion of sort is certainly a problematic and complex one, and the 
of providing an analysi. for it goe. far beyond the limits of the present 
I tend to regard sorts as seta of classificatory principles elaborated 
in the course of their interaction with the world. Some of these 
principles (like, e.g., natural kinds) might correspond to real 
structurel existing in the world, while others (such aa, artifacts) 
not.I3 Iri order to see more clearly what tha role of aortal concepta in 
grammar ought to be, conaider the following exsmples:, 
The it. in (34) could refer to something to which no sortal concept applies, 
·like, say, the heterogeneous matter raised by the fight between a dog and a 
·'cat. On the other hand in (35Y we are speaking about something clearly 
identifiable among the inhabitants of our everyday world. That might be 
exactly what di.tinguishes statea from event8 and processes. This is a rough 
first approximation to a complicated topic, but it looka to me a plausible 
starting point. What we need now ia some model-theoretic machinery againat 
which theae intuitiona can be tested. 
For the analyais of stages (i.e. portions of matter) all we need to assume i. 
that among our individuals there are quantities or portion. of matter. 
''Things" can then be repreaented as individual concepta, i.e. functions from 
world., times, and places to quantitie. of matter •. Episodic properties will be 
modeled a8 seta of portions of matter. while characterizing propertie. will be 
modeled as sets of individual concepts of the type juat described. 
Let A be the set of quantities or portions of matter. One can think of A 
either aa the power set of some set of atoms or. more neutrallI a. a 
partially ordered set with a complete join semilattice structure on it 4. Let 
also ~ (for ~Qf ~ be a I-place predicative conatant of IL*. and 
let F be the interpretation function such that for any constant of IL*. and 
any point of reference. F gives . the extension of that constant at that point 
of reference. We will simply assume that for any world i, time j. and place 
d, F(QM'. i,j,d) - A. This is all we need for talking about stages. 
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In IL* the "up" operator 'M is defined just for predicative expressions an 
not for individual terms, so we don't have any device to refer directly t 
individual concepts. We can represent them closely enough, though, as on, 
place properties that at each point of reference hold of just a singl. 
individual, in the way suggested in Montague's "Prsgmatics ad Intensiona: 
Logic" (see Montague 1974). Within the framework of IL*, individual concepti 
can be defined as follows: 
It is possible then to isolate the individual concepts that at each point of 
reference pick out stages (Le. portions of matter); they will be those 
satisfying the following formula: 
(37) 0 Vz[sw.(z)AAy["p(y) ++ Z - y]] 
Let's call m-individual concepts (in symbols InConm) those that satisfy (37). 
I propose to represent the inhabitants of our common sense world as m-
individual concepts, Le. functions from points of reference to portions of 
matter. l5 Of course, not any old function from points of reference to 
portions of matter will be a genuine "thing". We hit here one of the most 
debated problems in modal logic: not any world-line is a good one, not any 
individual concept represents (or corresponds to) a genuine individual Un 
the pretheoretical sense of the word). The individual concept that picks out 
all of John's manifestations is a good one; the one that picks out the 
manifestations of whoever happens to be the president of the United States is 
not a good one, doesn't correspond to a genuine "thing". I will leave it open 
here precisely how genuine "things" are to be singled out; one could resort to 
a Lewis-like counterpart relation or to some other set of criteria of 
spatiotemporal continuity and causal connection. For now, we can simply take 
thing' (abbreviated as th) to be a l-place predicative constant of 1L* and 
require that "things" be m-individual concepts: 
(38) A xO [tb(x) -+ InConm(x)] 
We can now easily make sure that characterizing properties (e.g. CNs) are 
analyzed as sets of "things", while episodic-properties are analyzed as sets 
of stages, by making use of the following axiom schemata: 
(39) IIxO[o{x) -+th(x)] where 0 is a common count (concrete) noun or 
stative VP 
(40) II xO [Sex) .... .Qtl(x) J where f3 is a non-stative VP 
This gives us a precise characterization of stages and "things". 
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Kinds will be analyzed as nominalized predicates. Of course a predicate 
yields a kind only if it has a sortal nature and/or encodes regular patterns 
of behavior of the objects that fall within its extension. So, for instance, 
the property of being a relative of mine does not constitute a kind. In fact, 
as Carlson accurately notes, bare plural NPs like relatives of mine and ~ 
in ~ next room systematically fail all the tests for being kind-level NPs, 
and behave pretty much as (existentially) quantified NPs. I think that one 
can safely assume that all basic CNs of an adult vocabulary (except, maybe, 
very special CNs like thing) are projected as kinds when nominalized. This 
gives us a set of "basic" kinds, representing the classificatory set-up 
encoded in a grammar. This set might be language particular, and even subject 
to changes within the same speaker in correspondence to the various stages of 
his/her ontogenetical development. In addition, from a logical point of view, 
the set of basic kinds is clearly not closed with respect to the standard 
logical operations: the union of two kinds might not be a kind itself.16 For 
our purposes, we will assume kind' (abbreviated as kn) to be a I-place 
o constant of IL*; of course all kinds will be I-place properties, but what 
counts as a kind will vary according to the particular model we will be 
assuming. In general, however, all basic common nouns will be associa~ed with 
--~killds. 
Bare plurals will be analyzed, following Carlson, as names or kinds. They are 
going to be introduced in the grammar by the following pairs of rules: 
SlOO. If Il € PCN and Il is plural then FIOO(Il) EO PT, where 
FIOO is the identity mapping. 
TIOO. If U € PCN' then FIOO(U) translates as Api"Pi(~Il'). 
So, for inst!lnc.e, the translation of the NP J!Qu in, say, J!Qu.l!ll numerous, 
will be AP1"P1(~~), and the reduced translation of the entire sentence 
will be numerous' (~~), which says simply that the kind of dogs has the 
property of being a nUmerous kind (cf. 4.3 below for more details). What SIOO 
and TIOO essentially do is to transform a predicate expression into a name. 
This should make clear in which sense the formation of bare plurals can be 
viewed ss a particular case of nominalization. Within the framework of IL*, 
category switching rules like SIOO are completely straightforward and do not 
require any further readjustment of the system of syntactic categories. To 
speak about kinds we can use the same stock of predicates we use to speak 
about other objects, a step that in IL was prevented by the presence of the 
hierarchy of types. 
The sorts of objects we have considered so far do not exhaust what we can find 
in our domain of individuals. In particular, we will talk about substances, 
i.e. things like gold, water, etc. In the next section we will see how they 
are related to quantities of matter. Besides quantities of matter, "things", 
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kinds, and substances, there will be many other sorts of individuals: 
events, groups of things, freedom, brotherhood and equality, etc. But for the 
time being we will limit our attention just to the former. 
The ontology for English we have so far is summarized in the following 
diagram: 
~ , INDIVIDUALS 
KINDS ''THINGS'' 
QUANTITIES or (chairs, men, etc.) (me, you, D D ... PORTIONS of New York, 
MATTER I SUBSTANCES 
etc.)1 
Fido, etc 
(stages, piece (water RaId 
of gold, etc.) '" ./ 
-
The arrows in the diagram indicate various ways in which the boxes are 
related; they don't have a uniform interpretation. What they represent 
depends on how the objects in the boxes are defined. For instance, we have 
defined "things" as individual concepts th1ilt have portions of matter as their 
values, and this determines how to interpret the bidirectional arrow 
connecting the box portions of matter with that of "things", and so on. Thus, 
our domain of individuals is articulated in a complex network of dependencies. 
How complex the ontology will have to be is in part an empirical question: it 
depends on what has grammatical relevance and what doesn't. Notice that by 
getting rid of types we flatten out the domain of individuals. In IL* 
everything (literally everything, the domain of individuals itself, cf. 
Chierchia 1981) can be the value of an individual variable. But this of 
course doesn't mean that the domain of individuals has no structure; indeed it 
has a very complex one. 
Let's go back to bare plurals. What we want to do at this point is to provide 
a precise model-theoretic analysis of Carlson's realization relation. In 
order to do BO, we need some further machinery. First let's adopt the 
following notational convention: 
"xfly" has to be read as "x is in the extension of y". Notice that the 
following is a valid wff of IL*: 
In the system we are going to propose we will define Carlson's realization 
relation in terms of the notion of mereological sum, which we will write 
officially as S* and unofficially as +. We will take S* to be a 3-place 
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relation of IL* such that for any x, y and z, S*(x)(y)(z) holds iff x and y 
are portions of matter and z is their sum. It would be possible to 
characterize 5* in terms of some version of the axioms for mereological sum. 
In the case at hand, however it is simpler to provide directly the semantics 
for 5*, which can be done as follows: 
(43) For any time i, world j and place d, and for any u,u', U" EU, 
F(S*)«i,j,d»(u)(u')(u") = I iff u,u',u" E A and u" = u U u'. 
Let's assume, moreover, the following notational convention: 
(44) x + y = "\.z S*(x)(y)(z) 
Given +'"we can easily define a ali of relation, in the following terms: 
(45) part of' =dfAXAY[x+y = yl 
We can now define stepwise first what it means for a stage (i.e. a portion of 
matter> to realize a "thing" (and we will call this form ofrealizaHon Rel)' 
then what it mllans for a stage to realize a kind (and we will call this form 
of realization Re2); finally, we will take Carlson's realization relation R 
to be just the union of the two relations so defined (an~ we will call it Re). 
Formally: 
(46) ReI = AXAy[th(x) A y~l 
Given the way "things" are, Rei turns out to be a function (for any "thing" x 
there is a unique portion of matter that constitutes its value at any given 
point of reference). So we can write: 
, II' is the restriction of Montague's ''1' operator, to a particular sort of 
individual concept. 
Re2 will be defined as follows: 
(48) Re2 = AxAy[kn(x) A VzVw[z f. w A z l!. x AWl!. x A part of e~z + IIw)(y)ll 
So a stage realizes2 a kind iff it is the fusion of some realizationl of some 
(at least two, for the plurslity presupposition of bsre plurals) instances of 
the kind. Finally, we will have: 
(49) Re 
Given the present definition of the realization relation, all of Carlson's 
axioms, (except for (12» will have to be abandoned. But we already argue 
that they provide an inadequate characterization of the notion of stage. On 
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the other hand, the approach presented here provides us with a conceptually 
sharp definition of the notion of stage and of the realization relation R, 
using an apparatus that seems to be independently needed for dealing with maSS 
nouns. We will see in section 4~ how the notion introduced here can do some 
real work for us in describing the grammar of English bare pl~rals. 
4.2 ! note 9.!!. !!!.U..!.!!.2.!!.!!!!.. In what follows, I wou Id like to skHch how our 
framework could be extended to accommodate a theory of mass nouns. Consider 
the following examples: 
(50) the ring is gold 
(51) gold is an element 
It is possible to argue, following essentially ter Meu1en 1981, that &2lt in 
(50) is a predicate expression (syntactically a CN) having a set of quantities 
as its extension, while in (51) is a name of the substance gold (syntactically 
an NP), where substances can be analyzed as the intension of the corresponding 
CN (i.e. as functions from points of reference to sets of quantities of gold). 
Thus, predicative mass nouns can be taken to have as substance their intension 
nominal mass nouna refer to substances like proper names to their bearer. 
Therefore, within the present approach it is very natural to regard mass NPs 
as nominalizations of mass CNs. 




this stuff is gold 
this ring is gold 
this substance is gold 
The subject of (52a) refers to some quantity of matter, to which the property 
of being gold is being sttributed. In (52c), however, the very same property 
is attributed to a "thing", namely a certain ring. What (52b) seems to say, 
intuitively, is that the ring in question is .!!fgold. Finally, in (52c), the 
property of being gold is attributed to some s'ubstance. Notice that (52c) 
doesn't have to be an identity statement. The substance referred to might be 
some subspecies of gold (such as, say, white gold). so, the VP is gold 
appears to be quite liberal with respect to the kind of subjects it can take. 
We might attribute this ambiguity to the copula itself. One of the syntactic 
functions of the verb ~~ is that of mapping a set of non-verbal categories 
(such as adjectives, common nouns, prepositional phrases) into VPs. How the 
verb ~~ contributes to the semantics of the entire VP is a complex and open 
question. What we will do here is to try to maintain one of the standard 
hypotheses about the verb ~ ~ namely that it is semantically empty. It is 
unlikely that this hypothesis can resist a more detailed analysis of tense and 
aspect, but such an analysis goes far beyond the limits of the present paper. 
If we take ~ ~ to be semantically empty (i.e. the identity function, or 
something analogous), then the variety of readings that the VP ~ ~ &2lt can 
have in (52a-c) is to be attributed to the CN itself. We could proceed as 
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follows. It seems plausible to assume that in some primary sense, gold is a 
predicate that applies to quantities of stuff (as exemplified in (52a». So, 
we might have a predicate of IL*, say goldl , that can be truly attributed only 
to quantities. 
(53) A xD [goldl (x) ... QM(x) 1 
Then it is easy to construct a derivative sense in which the CN gold is 
attributed to "things" that are made of gold. We might represent this reading 
in terms of a predicate of IL*, call it gold2 , defined as follows: 
Recall that "things" are individual concepts that have portions of stuff as 
their values. So, &2l!!2 would denote at each point of reference. the set 
of "things" that have quantities of &2l!!1 as their values. 
Finally, it is possible to attribute the CN gold to some of its sub-substances 
{£ikr ••• • Js1,l.ch. ss •. white&2l!!> .... In. this •. respect",it .is .. wor.thwhHec .. emphas.izing •. once .. more· 
that the notion of substance we are employing is not that of ''natural'' kind. 
though is related to it. The grammar of English simply does not make such a 
distinction. What the grammatical notion of kind and substance have in common 
with natural kinds of substances is that they both are taken to constitute 
patterns of regularity in the behavior of objects. But the criteria 
identifying such regularities are very different. For natural kinds and 
substances, they are provided by nature (whatever that may mean); for 
grammatical kinds and substances, theymay be determined by a heterogeneous set 
of linguistic dispositions and conventions <including "natural" dispositions). 
At any rate, (52c) can be represented by positing a further constant of IL*, 
golda' defined as follows: 
golda would represent the meaning of the CN gold in sentences like (52c). So 
we can take our CN &9..l!! to be ambiguous between the readings represented by 
goldl • &2l!!2 and &2l!!3' We might, therefore, represent the meaning of the CN 
go ld as fo llows : 
However, we can achieve the same effects of this definition by constraining 
the meaning of the CN gold in terms of a set of meaning postulates. Recall 
that our realization relation ~ is a relation between entities and their 
stages. In particular, it holds between a "thing" and the stuff that realizes 
it and between a kind and the fusion of some members of that kind. Now, 
substances can be regarded as kinds whose members are not "thinga" but 
quantities. As a matter of fact, this view is forced upon us, if we regard 
nominal mass nouns (as the one in (51» as nominalized CNs, as we did for 
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plural CNs. Therefore, for something to be a stage of a kind which is a 
substance will simply be to be a quantity of that substance. Our realization 
relation ~ can be straightforwardly extended to cover such a case by 
extending Re2 (48) as follows: 
(57) Re~ -df AyAx[kn{y)A VzVw[z ~ w A zAy A wAy A 
[part of'(l/z + ¥w)(x)] v [part of'(z+w)(x}]]l 
We can now characterize the meaning of mass nouns like gold in terms of the 
following set of meaning postulates: 
(58) a. AxD[gold'(x) + [QM(x)V lIy[Re(x)(y) "'gold'(y)]] 
b. Ayi\xO([Re(x)(y) Agold'(y)J+ gold'{x)] 
c. AyI'\xO [[gold'{x) A gold'(y) A QM(:uy)J ... gold'(x+y) 1 
(58a-c) achieve the same effects of (53)-(55) without having to posit 
"abstract" notions such as goldn• In particular, (58c) imposes a join 
lattice structure on the quantities that are in the extension of mass CNs. 
(58a-c) jointly are taken to be an abstract representation of the semantic 
structure of mass nouns. All we need to do, then, is to extend to mass nouns 
our nominalization rule. 
(59) S100'. If a € PCN and a is mass or a is plural, then 
FIOO(a) PT, where FIOO is the identity mapping. 
So, the formation of bare plural and mass NPs is analyzed as different 
instances of the same grammatical process. This seems to offer a unified and 
maximally simple account of such nominal structures that embodies a number of 
interesting claims. First, given (59), we ought to expect mass and plural NPs 
to pattern alike with respect to scope and anaphora. In Chierchia 1982b, I 
have tried to show that all the relevant properties that characterize bare 
plurals also apply to mass nominals. Second, sentences like (52a-c) receive a 
uniform semantic representation that matches their uniform syntactic 
structure. To exemplify, consider the sentence !h£ ring iL gold. Its 
semantic representation will be: 
(60) Vyt\x[[ring'(x} ...... x • y1A gold'(y)J 
In virtue of (58a-c), this will be true iff x is a "thing" constituted of 
gold. Moreover, if the ring in question hss the property of, say, having been 
made by a famous jeweler, the quantity of gold that makes it up obviously 
will not have such property. In sentences like (51), on the other hand, the 
eN gold is nominalized by our rule (59). So its translation will be: 
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(61) says of the substance gold that it is an element. Consider now a 
sentence like white gold is gold (which is analogous to (52c». I take white 
to be an intersective adjective. So, the meaning of the CN white ~ will be 
represented as A x [white'(x) "go ld'(x)] (8 ee on this Chierchia 1982a). 
This CN can then un4er$0 our nominalization rule (59), becoming an NP whose 
meaning will be APl,o.-p1(~Ax[ white'(x)" gold'(x)]). So the reduced translation 
of the sentence in question will be: 
(62) gold'(AAx[white'(x) "gold'(x)]) 
By (58a-b) this is equivalent to 
(63) Ay[Re(A).x[white'(x)" gold'(x)] )(y) + gold'(y)] 
(73) says roughly that all the quantities of white gold are quantities of 
gold. Now by the definition of k (49), (63) is IL*-equivalent to 
AY[Ax[white'(x) A gold'(x) ](y) + gold'(y)] 
cou~rse;(64)i8~it*;:va:J.id,and/Tnus/wiiitegoldl8'gold/ fs log"icarry"true. 
So, our semantics seems to attribute the intuitively correct meaning to this 
sentence, and captures our intuitions about a relevant set of entailments 
involving mass nouns. 
Moreover, given the present approach, we expect to be able to explain the 
behavior of mass nouns in terms of the same apparatus developed in connection 
with bare plurals. To make an example, let's consider the interaction of mass 
nouns with tense and aspect. The progressive will select, in general, the 
existential reading of mass nominals, while the generic present tense will 
select the universal one, as expected: 
(65) a. 
b. 
polluted water is dripping on the floor 
polluted water upsets John 
In (65a), po1luted ~ has an existential import, while in (65b) it has a 
universsl one. This pair of sentences will be treated just like analogous 
sentences with bare plursls. Their reduced translation will, thus, be: 
(66) a. Vy[Re(A).x[polluted'(x) "water'(x)])(y)" drip-on-the-floor'(y)] 
b. Gn(Aupset')(j)(AAx[polluted'(x)A water'(x)]) 
In (75b) the property of upsetting John is attributed to the substance 
polluted water as a whole. (66a), on the other hand, says that an instance or 
stage or the substance in question is dripping on the floor. Stages are, 
however, quantities of matter; so, what (66a) in effect says is that some 
quantities of polluted water are dripping on the floor, which seems to be the 
right meaning for (65a). Analogous accounts will go through for the other 
characteristics that mass nouns have in common with bare plurals. such as, for 
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instance, the lack of wide scope reading for &lll.!!. in John il!. ~ 1l!!:. gold 
(see next section). No specific stipulations are needed. 
This is of course very sketchy and preliminary. However, it should suffice to 
show that to incorporate a treatment of mass nouns in an analysis of bare 
plurals like the one presented here not only appears to be straightforward, 
but also enlightening. The present approach seems able to capture in a 
principled way various of the crucial generalizations concerning syntactic and 
semantic properties that these structures appear to share. ' 
4.3 Meaning postulates 1l!!:. English !!AD!~. We are now about to collect 
the harvest of our ontological sowing. We will present a set of meaning 
postulates that allow us to achieve all the essential results of Carlson's 
theory, while avoiding its problematic aspects. A PTQ-like fragment of 
English that implements a slight revision of the theory presented here can be 
found in Chierchia 1982a. In that fragment, the language used for the 
translation is IL*. The basic set up of the translation is the same as PTQj 
for example, NPs are translated as A-expressions denoting sets of properties, 
i.e • ..I!!.!!n.' - AP"P(j), .!.mn' = ApVx[mn'(x) A"p(x)], etc. The peculiarity of 
IL* «nnilily its being a type-free language) will allow us, however, a freedom 
whose advantages will become clear in a moment. 
We have already presented meaning postulstes (39): and (40) that discriminate 
charac terizing properties (in part icular, common (count, concrete), nouns, 
and, maybe adjectives of the class of intelligent) from non-state-properties 
(in particular, all basic intransitive verbs together with, maybe, 
prepositional phrsses and adjectives like ~). An analogous pair of 




Oo(x)(y) ... .ll.(y) 
Oo(x)(y) ... th(y) 
where 0 is hit', ~', ~', etc. 
where 0 is love', ~', know', etc. 
In order to go further we have to display how extensional verbs are going to 
be treated in the present framework, which will give us the opportunity show 
some features of systems like IL* (i.e. type-free). "Being a quantifier" has 
to be regarded as a semantic, model-theoretical notion (cf. Barwise and 
Cooper, 1981). That is to say, such a property selects certain objects in the 
model: something is a quantifier iff (roughly speaking) it is a set of 
properties. Now, such a notion can be formally defined in IL*, as follows: 
(69) Qn(x) ++ [property'(x) A Ay[y6x ... property'(y)]] 
where property' is defined in the obvious manner: 
(70) property' =dfAx V pi[pi = x] 
42 
26
University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 9 [1983], Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol9/iss2/3
The definition of ~ might be insufficient as general definition of the notion 
of quantifier, but for our purposes it will do.17 We will use the notion of 
"being a quantifier" in our extensionalizing axiom for transitive verbs: 
(1) O[[a'(x)(y) 1\ Qn(x») -- Az[.,Qn(z) 1\ a'(z)(y»)/lx) 
where a is any extensional verb 
Let's see how this works. consider: 
(72) John loves a woman. 
The reduced translation of (72) before the application of (71) will be: 
Let fl - AApiVy[woman'(y) 1\ "pi(y»); since fl clearly satisfies the definition 
of ~, ~(fl) is true. Thus we can use (71) to infer from (73): 
From (75), by the usual steps of A-conversion and down-up cancellation, we 
obtain: 
It is commonly assumed that humans are not quantifiers. We, may be somewhst 
over killing, in having actually built this requirement in our meaning 
postulate (75). Thus, (76) is logically equivalent to: 
This way of handling extensional verbs, while being quite similar to 
Montague's original one, seems to be more natural in the following respect. 
In PTQ the interpretation of any transitive verb involves two completely 
different functions, represented by love' and love* respectively. In IL*, on 
the other hand, we have a unique function, namely ~; and we simply require 
(through (71» that whenever love' is applied to a quantifier, say A!!!m' it 
will yield the property that x has just in case for some man y, x loves y. 
We can now write a meaning postulate requiring that verbs like hit involve 
stages of their grammatical object, which will give us the desired existential 
reading of bare plurals in object position: 
(78) O[[o(x)(y) 1\ th(x») -- Vz(.k(x)(z) 1\ o(z)(y»)) 
where is hk', ~', £l!itt', etc. 
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In a moment we will give some examples of the interaction hetween (78) and 
(71). First we have to show what the rule that combines verbs with their 






If a € PIV then F7(a) € PIV ' where F7(a) is the present l>rogressive of a. If a € PIV then F7(a) translates as AxVy[k(x}(y)" a'(x)] 
If a € PIV and a € PT then F8(a,a) E Pt , where F8(a,a) = aa'; 
and a' is the third person (plural or singular according to a) of the 
simple present of the main verb in a. \ 
If a € PT and a € PIV ' then: 
if a' is a characterizing property, then F8(a,a) translates 
aa a'(Aa'), otherwise 
F8(a,a) translates as a'(AGn(Aa'». 
At first sight these rules might look more awkward than they in fact are. 510 
should be the rule for the present progressive. Semantically, such a rule 
takes a process or event and maps it into a characterizing property (namely, 
the property of being an x such that a stage of x is aing). Notice that the 
present semantics will make logically false, thus deviant, a sentence like 
John il. knowing M.!ll.. since !2. know M.ill is slready a characterizing property. 
511 is meant to exemplify the rule for the habitual simple present. Its 
semantics mske use of the notion of "being a characterizing-property". This 
could possibly be regarded as a semantic feature (on a par with things like 
"being downward entailing" or "being monotone"). Of course, both rules are 
purely illustrative and shouldn't be taken too seriously. They are meant only 
to show that the present treatment of bare plurals is compatible with recent 
work on the syntax and semantics of English aspectual systems, including 
Gazdar, Pullum, and Sag, 1981, and Bach, 1980b, and should eventually be 
recast in some such framework. 
Here is an example of how the system presented so far works when we get bare 
plurals in the object position of non-stative verbs: 19 
(19) John is raking leaves, t => Api~i(j)(AAxVy[Re(x)(y) 
\ ~ llM'(AAP1vp1(A1uf")}(y)]) 
John,T => AP1~1(j) he raking leaves, IV => AxVy[Re(x)(y) 
~ . r~ke'(AApivpi(A~'»(y)] 
rake leaves,IV => rake'(AAP1~1(A~'» 
/ ~ .. 
rake,TV => ~ leaves,T => AP1vp1(A~') 
lelves,CN -> leaf' 
I , leaf,CN => leaf 
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(80) reduction of the translation of (79) 
(i) Api~pi(j)(AAxVy[Re(x)(y) A rake'(AApi~i(AJ&!f'»(y)]) 
(ii) Vy[Re(j)(y) A ~'(AApi¥pi(AJ&!f'»(y)]) 
by two steps of A-conversion and down-up cancellation 
(iii) Vy[Re(j)(y) A Apivpi(Aleaf')(A z[,Qn(z) A ~'(z)(y)])] 
by (71) and def. of Qn 
(iv) Vy[Re(j)(y) A ~'(Aleaf')(y) A ,Qn(AJ&!f)] 
by two steps of A-conversion and down-up cancellation 
(v) Vy[Re(j)(y) A ~'(Aleaf')(y)] by tautologous transformation 
What (vi) says is that the manifestation of John at the point of evaluation is 
involved in an activity of leaves-raking, i.e. that John is raking some 
leaves. This is precisely what we wanted. Consider now the following 
sentence: 
(81) John is seeking unicorns. 
The translation of (81), after straightforward simplifications, will be: 
In the system developed in Chierchia 1981, something analogous to Montague's 
substar notation reduces (82) to: 
The existential import of (83) with respect to the object of ~ can be 
obtained, as we have already seen, in terms of s meaning postulate, which we 
can state in the framework of IL* as follows: 
So, in virtue of (84), (83) will be equivalent to: 
(85) will also be the translation of "John is seeking a unicorn", which will 
capture its relatedness of (81). 
This shows that the present theory of bare plurals doesn't force us to a 
semantic analogue of a lexical-decomposition analysis of intensional verbs, 
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like the one Carlson proposes (cf. Carlson 1977. pp. 166 ffJ. No problem 
arises here with respect to intensionality. 
Notice also that the other problems pointed out in sec. 2 disappear. Stages 
are regarded as portions of matter. Thus. no complications with respect to 
the standard treatment of tenses arise. The plurality presupposition of bare 
plurals is built in the definition of ~. so the counterintuitive results 
discussed with respect to (22)-(23) are, avoided. Finally the bipartition of 
English VPs into stage- and object-level predicstes is obtsined vis a ,set of 
meaning postulates. This avoids the odd use of semantic sorts and the 
complications in the translation mapping present in Carlson's approach. In 
our theory all the burden is put on the semantics; furthermore we can 
accomplish this by exploiting a mechanism (Le. meaning postulates) that is 
needed anyhow in MG. The meaning postulates presented here can be regarded as 
a fragment of a theory of English aspectual system. Their status is analogous 
to that of the meaning postulates proposed by Dowty (1976) for dealing with 
causstivity. Finally. all the notions introduced by Carlson are reanalyzed in 
terms of a different model theoretic approach. In particular. the formation 
of bare plurals turns out to be an instance of a much more general process of 
nominslization. Regarding bare plurals as nominalized CNs allows us. among 
other things. to shed some light on their relation with mass nouns. In this 
respect the framework developed here seems able to offer a lot of 
potentialities for a unified account of bare plurals and mass nouns. It 
remains to be seen to what extent the hypothesis entertained here will turn out 
to be fruitful or at least compatible with a fuller treatment of tense. 
aspect. and plurality. The present approach might be viewed ss offering some 
fairly clear adequateness criteria for any such general theory. 
FOOTNOTES 
lCarlson 1977. 1979. 
2Cf • Bach 1979. 1980a 
3I am assuming here Bennett's (1976) modification of Montague's original 
assignment of types to syntactic categories. 
4CN is the category of common nouns in Montague 1973 (PTQ). In the text, I 
will use NP to refer to PTQ's category T. S to refer to PTQ's category t. and 
VP to refer to PTQ's categories IV and TV. 
5There is a vast literature on the distinction between events, processes. and 
ststes. For s good presentation of the main issues involved. cf. Dowty, 1979. 
Ch. 2. 
6Cf • Carlson 1980. 
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7 Carlson 1977, pp. 194 ff points out, however, that there is a set of bare 
plurals that pattern like quantified NPs. 
81 am adopting here the familiar notation of PTQ: primed expressions denote 
their translations in IL. 
9For the reportive reading of John runs, Carlson has a special rule thst maps 
VPs into VPs; such a rule would leave syntactially unmodified run, and would 
change run' to AXVy[Re(x)(y) A run'(y)], so that it can be combined with John. 
lONot in the trivial sense of being generated by quantifying in John into ~ 
,,~ for different ns. 
lIThis is obtained by alternating Carlson's version of the dervied VP rule 
with the rules that introduce Gn and Gn'. 
analysis of the evils of type theory as a theory of 
for nstural languages, cf. Chierchia 1982a. 
fozmaLanalys.is, of ,the notion"oL, sort and its role in 
cf. Cocchiarella 1976. 
14More precisely, a function from points of reference to singletons containing 
just one stage (i.e. one portion of matter). 
l5Such an spproach has been proposed by G. Link at the Konstanz conference on 
formal semantics, 1981. 
16So , for instance, the property of being a fork or a man does not yield a 
kind. This might be the reason why .fs!m .21:. !U!!. ~ widespread is odd. , 
17Not ice, n P.!.!.!l.I!!!., that properties of quantifiers like being "monotone" or 
"being persistent", etc. can slso be directly defined in 1L*. 
18The numbers of the rules are the same of the fragment in Chierchia 1982a. 
The prime sign indicates that the rules presented here constitute a slight 
revision of the ones presented there. 
19More examples can be found in Chierchia 1982a. 
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